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I. Introduction
o A. Purposes of the mission
Prom 24 March to 6 April a mission, composed of two members of INTERTECT 
and one staff member of UNHCR, visited Somalia to review the emergency operations. 
The objectives were:
1. To examine the emergency operations in order to study how UNHCR responds 
to situations of this type and to observe the procedures, staffing and methods 
of operating by which UNHCR responds to an emergency situation.
2. To assess the operational capabilities of UNHCR in the Somalia operation 
and to draw out the lessons learned for future relief operations in similar 
environments and circumstances.
Specifically, the mission was concerned with the following:
1. Decentralization of decision-making;
2. ^Staffing patterns;
3. Co-ordination with implementing partners;
4. Technical problems;
5. Information requirements;
6. Overall operations planning;
7. Preparedness of UNHCR for the emergency.
The Somalia case study is part of a comprehensive study on emergency 
preparedness and response capabilities of UNHCR as outlined in PCS/411 of 
26 July 1979 and the terms of reference in PCS/55I dated 23 November 1979*
The itinerary was planned so that the mission could visit representative 
refugee settlements in all areas. Visits were arranged to approximately half 
of all the refugee camps now open, and included older "closed” camps, older 
camps that are open to new arrivals, several new camps that have been estab­
lished since November, and a transit centre on the border, which is currently 
receiving and processing new arrivals. The camps visited were in three of the 
four regions where concentrations of refugees reside, and as a total of 10
camps were visited, it was felt that a representative sample of the range of 
problems was viewed by the mission.
Specifically, the mission visited the following camps (in chronological
B. Itinerary
order):
1# Shabelli region: Corioli One
Corioli Two
Corioli Three
22.
3.
Hargeisa region: Saba*ad
Dam
Agabar;
Gedo region: Halba One
Halba Two 
Ali Matin
A1 Waq (a transit camp).
The members of
the mission concentrated on examining the administrative structure of the 
relief organizations in each region, and the administrative structures in 
each camp. Also observed were logistics, storage and distribution systems 
for each region and each camp. The operations of each camp, such as water 
supply, sanitation, etc., and medical and social services delivered by imple­
menting agencies were examined in detail,
C. Methodology
The mission was composed of a disaster operations specialist/planner, 
a nutritionist/public health specialist, and a former UNHCR refugee camp 
administrator. In each camp the team divided to conduct individual investi­
gations into each of the various assigned topics, generally following a 
checklist that was then transferred to a series of work-sheets developed for 
this mission. The observations and lessons learned, which form Part II of 
this report, are categorized according to the topics explored by the mission,
D, Background to the situation
The current emergency in Somalia is a result of a renewed flare-up of 
a situation which has been generating refugees for the last 5 years. Until 
1979, "the situation was more or less static, then in February of 1979 new 
refugees began to cross into Somalia, By November the numbers of new arrivals 
were estimated at over 700,000, 500*000 °f whom were settled into a number of 
camps in the border regions. At first, the new refugees were placed in camps 
which had been established for refugees entering the country several years 
earlier, but by October it was evident that new camps would be required.
Due to poor record keeping it is difficult to verify the number of 
refugees. The official figures are at best rough estimates and in some camps 
the population figures are as much as 30$ inflated.
3One distinct characteristic of the refugees is that fact that approxi­
mately 80% are women and children. Few young or middle-aged men are in 
the camps. The lack of able-bodied men and the fact that more than half 
the camp population is classified nutritionally as the vulnerable groups 
pose special problems for the relief operations.
II* Observations and lessons learned
A* Administration and resource management
The following observations relate to the administration and organization 
of the UNHCR Branch Office.
1* The role of UNHCR - The actual role of UNHCR in Somalia is not clear. 
Despite an agreement worked out with, the Government specifying the overall 
role of UNHCR, it remains obvious that the specifics relating to that role 
are not clearly understood by the Government of Somalia, the voluntary agencies, 
nor indeed by many of the staff of UNHCR. While HCR is not operational in 
the usual sense, both the voluntary agencies contracted by HCR and the Govern­
ment look to HCR for leadership and direction in many of the specific opera­
tional areas. The failure of HCR to provide this direction 
is viewed as a major constraint both by the voluntary agencies and by the 
Government.
The factors contributing to the impreciseness of the defined role include 
the recent change in the situation from a static to a more fluid, growing 
influx of refugees; the designation of HCR as the co-ordinator and funder of 
the voluntary agencies (which have only recently been allowed to re-establish 
in the country); a lack of understanding as to possible modes of involvement 
on the part of the agencies; and to general indecision and delay on the part 
of HCR concerning actions to take to resolve specific problems in the camps.
Lessons and implications for emergency preparedness - It is clear from this 
experience that HCR will often be called upon to take an active though not 
completely operational, role in emergency operations. There:are various levels, 
or increments, of involvement, beginning with the traditional passive roles 
of HCR, moving to more active funding and technical assistance roles, and 
ultimately a fully operational role. A changing situation may require an 
escalation of involvement beyond that foreseen in the initial stages. Thus 
training and management systems should be developed which take into account 
the possibilities of incremental levels of involvement and 'define specific 
parameters and activities at each level.
2. Organization - In reviewing the table of organization for the HCR Somalia 
operation several factors were noted. First, at the Branch Office level the 
table of organization is adequate and lies within the general span-of-control 
limits that one would expect for this type of operation^ At the field level
l/ Span-of-control refers to the number of men or operations that one adminis­
trator can effectively control at any one time.
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of the operation, however, there are no clear lines of authority, no designated 
lines or levels of co-ordination, and in most of the field operations conducted 
hy implementing agencies, span-of-control is exceeded.
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - Guidance on 
preparing tables of organization should be included in an Emergency Operations 
Handbook prepared for field officers and Branch Offices, and should be included 
in the staff training programme.
3. Staffing - Despite the expansion of the office staff from a minimal, 
caretaker staff prior to the emergency to a staff of 35 at the present time, 
the increases are inadequate, both in terms of the number of personnel and 
in the skills required to provide the services demanded by the situation.
The local staff is especially deficient in technical personnel, particularly 
in the health and nutrition fields, as well as deficient in personnel with 
experience in women’s projects and social services for refugees. Specialists 
in logistics and environmental problems are also required.^
The Branch Office has pointed out that the inability to staff up quickly 
has been caused by the delay in getting approvals from Headquarters. It is 
felt by the HCR Branch Office that in an emergency situation the Office must 
have authority to hire locally and to go outside the normal HCR personnel 
recruitment system in order to hire the necessary staff quickly. These 
could be hired on short and intermediate-term contracts, in order to meet 
the requirements of the emergency situation, according to the Branch Office.
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - The personnel 
employment practices of HCR do not facilitate emergency response. There are 
three options for improving the situation:
a. Waiving the existing procedures during the initial stages and granting 
authority to the Branch Office to hire a limited number of Staff on the spot?
b. Revising or streamlining the existing procedures;
c. Developing alternative procedures that can go into effect once an emer­
gency has been declared by the High Commissioner.
In most of the developing countries a variety of technical personnel can 
be found working on development projects. These often make’'excellent temporary 
additions to an emergency operations staff. If the above changes are under­
taken, HCR can more easily take advantage of this resource.
|
4* Job specifications - It was observed that the majority of new personnel 
arriving in Somalia, as well as those retained locally, were hired without speci 
fic jobs or tasks in mind. This resulted in many days of delay, while specific 
roles and assignments were worked out for each newly-arriving individual.
Contributing to this problem is the fact that requests for personnel
¥ One person has recently been assigned the job of logistics officer, but 
the mission feels additional assistance is required.
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were often imprecise. In many cases, the specific type of technician needed 
to resolve a specific relief problem was not clearly understood by the 
personnel in the Branch Office.
Lessons and implications for emergency preparedness - Sample job specifica­
tions should be developed and included in a Handbook for Emergency Operations 
for the field staff, and guidance should be provided as to the specific 
technical fields and roles of technicians that correspond to resolution of 
specific relief problems. In short, it is not adequate simply to request 
an engineer: one must know the specific type of engineer to request in
order to match the appropriate professional to the problem.
5* Contingency planning - At the present time, there is virtually no 
contingency planning within the Somalia relief operation. This is especially 
critical in the feeding operations, as there are no back-up systems, such as 
supplementary feeding programmes, to assist in overcoming short and inter­
mediate-term influxes of new arrivals or shortages caused by stoppages inA
the logistic system. Furthermore, there is no monitoring system to provide 
information relating to potential problems developing within the existing 
operations, nor is there a way of monitoring the existing record-keeping 
systems to forecast needs either within the existing camp operations or for 
the new arrivals. It is the lack of such systems that is in part responsible 
for the critical shortage of food that now exists.
Factors that contribute to the lack of contingency planning are: a
lack of knowledge on the part of both UNHCR and the Government on how to 
carry out contingency planning in this type of situation; a lack of data 
from nearby countries as to events there that might precipitate new arrivals 
in Somalia; a lack of information sharing between all the various operational
Vagencies; and especially a deficiency on the part of the Government in not 
providing information on levels of supply within its regional stores for 
UNHCR. Finally, there are no UNHCR systems or standard procedures that 
would provide guidance on how to go about contingency planning.
Lessons and implications for emergency preparedness - UNHCR should develop 
model accounting and monitoring systems for use by implementing partners, 
which provide information in a form that can be used both to monitor the 
existing situation and to forecast future needs. Furthermore, HCR must 
provide staff training on what the indicators are that point to potential 
problems, and how to develop and verify data to assess future needs.
6. Communications - The team observed poor communications between all 
levels of the relief operation. Ironically, communications were worse in- 
house - i.e. between levels within the UNHCR system, especially between
Headquarters and the Branch Office, and the Branch Office and the field 
offices - than between UNHCR and its operating and implementing partners.
At the present time, great emphasis is being placed on the establishment of 
a radio system of communications; however, adequate radio and telephone 
links do exist in most parts of the country, and the problem appears not so 
much of how to communicate but of what to communicate. Information at the 
present time flows into the office in an unsystematic manner, without classifi­
cation as to priority, and without any standardized basis of reporting. 
Therefore, each influx of new information seems rather to confuse the situa­
tion and contribute to an overall crisis atmosphere in the Branch Office. 
Contributing factors are the distance between reporting stations and the lack 
of routines for transmission of information from the field to the Branch 
Office. Coupled with the lack of prioritization and standardization of 
terminology, impreciseness and confusion are the result.
Lessons and implications for emergency preparedness - UNHCR should develop 
standardized reporting procedures for field operations, and train field 
officers on what types of information to communicate and how to weight the 
messages in such a way as to clarify their relative importance during trans­
mission. When extraordinary messages are sent, they can then receive the 
proper attention. Communications discipline must be established and maintained 
in order to reduce overall confusion and to ensure that priority messages 
receive proper note.
The remoteness of the refugee camps in Somalia argues for the development*of a variety of radio communications systems, which could be identified and 
acquired by UNHCR and stockpiled for emergency operations use. Experience has 
shown, however, that governments are often reluctant to allow radio equipment 
in politically sensitive areas. Therefore, UNHCR should identify those 
frequencies that could be used and include the use of this equipment - at 
the specified frequencies - as part of the operations agreement signed with 
the Government in the initial stages of the operation.
7* Procurement - The mission observed that the procurement system was 
one of the major obstacles to a smooth-running operation. Long delays in 
procurement of almost every conceivable item were reported; special problems 
were noted in the areas of food procurement and transportation, particularly 
the acquisition of vehicles. The procurement system now in effect, whereby 
the Branch Office must receive approval from HQ for almost every expenditure, or 
request that Headquarters purchase on behalf of the Branch Office, is one of 
the major inhibitors of rapid response. Headquarters is simply not capable
of responding quickly. A general streamlining of procedures in Headquarters 
is not likely to produce the desired results. In the opinion of Branch Office 
(and the consultants), the Branch Office must have authority to purchase 
locally or regionally, so that aid is delivered promptly and is appropriate.
The entire issue of appropriate material aid is a larger question, in 
which UNHCR should participate. There is an active debate within the 
relief community that massive material aid is often inappropriate and 
counter-productive. However, that discussion is beyond the scope of this 
study.
In terms of response, delays often result from the distance between 
Geneva and the Branch Office, delays in communications, and time-consuming 
Contracts Committee procedures. It is also felt, at the field level, 
that there is a lack of manpower in the Geneva office to handle all the 
requests adequately, and that procurement priorities are unsystematic.
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - Procurement 
is one of the major activities of UNHCR in field operations. The normal pro­
curement procedures must be waived or extensively streamlined, and emergency 
procedures must be established that decentralize procurement authority to the 
Branch Office. However, if this is to be successful, HCR must also establish 
purchasing systems and procedures to ensure that local purchasing not only 
enables the Office to respond quickly but also provides information for 
monitoring the flow of goods through the system from the time they are pur­
chased to the time they arrive in the hands of the refugees, as well as pro­
viding data that will enable the Office to monitor consumption and establish 
contingency planning.
The lack of information on the status of requests and relief goods in 
the pipeline underscores another problem facing HCR: if HCR is not operational
the Government or voluntary agencies will develop and use their own procure­
ment and logistic systems. As most of these agencies do not have systems 
designed to provide information for use in contingency planning, it is 
often difficult for HCR - and indeed all the participants - to gather 
accurate information on material aid. HCR should therefore develop model 
systems, which can be provided to the Government and/or the implementing 
agencies, which will systematically provide information on the status of
9relief supplies. This should he given to implementors at the initial stages of 
the operation, so that it can he institutionalized before the other systems 
that would not provide the necessary information can he put into effect.
8. Logistics - Logistics systems in the Somali operation are inadequate at 
present. The Government of Somalia has no common monitoring or reporting 
system for its stores, and no means of forecasting relief material require­
ments. Record-keeping does exist in all the camps visited; however, the records 
which are kept are designed only to report on what has heen received and distri­
buted, not on what is needed and when it will he required. During the teanUs 
visit to one of the camps, food supplies had completely run out; yet this 
fact had not heen reported hack to the regional store, on the assumption 
that someone there was keeping records and would know that the camp was out 
of supplies. With the food at a marginal level, an accurate system of 
record-keeping of supplies on hand and the status of transport available 
is urgently needed.
To further complicate the logistics problem, the basic transport 
equations have not heen worked out. Thus, even if supplies were adequate, 
long delays in shipment would still occur. It was noted by the team that a 
staff member has heen assigned the role of logistics planner, and that more 
transport is currently on order. However, without an adequate logistics 
system, delays, confusion and losses are hound to occur.
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - Logistics 
are not necessarily complicated. There are standard transport equations and 
tables for planning, and systems and forms for monitoring that can easily he 
adapted for use by HCR. A model system should he chosen and included in a 
handbook for field officers on emergency operations, so tha^ an effective 
method can he employed early in the operation. When an operation reaches a 
certain level, a professional logistics expert should he sent to assist the 
field office.
9* Transport - The lack of transport has often heen cit.ed by various 
UNHCR personnel as a problem in the Somali operation. This issue can be 
divided into two categories, personal vehicles and heavy trucks. The team 
observed that the number of personal vehicles available for use by UNHCR 
and its implementing partners appeared to be more than adequate. Shortages 
do exist; however, they are caused by poor maintenance and the practice of 
assigning vehicles to individuals, rather than pooling vehicles for common 
use. Maintenance is complicated by the lack of standardization and over­
reliance on the use of four-wheel-drive vehicles. In the north, in Hargeisa,
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•there is easy access to Toyota Landcruisers from Djibouti; in this region, 
the Landcruiser should be the standard, and an adequate back-up of spare 
parts and accessories should be stockpiled by HCR. In the areas serviced 
from Mogadiscio, Landrovers appear to be the standard; one size of Landrover 
should be adopted as the standard, and again a back-up of spares and access­
ories should be stockpiled. It should be pointed out, however, that the use 
of 4WD vehicles is not required in all instances; only in a few instances did 
the team visit areas where 4WD vehicles would be extensively required, and for 
the majority of operations sufficient access can be attained by the use of 
vehicles such as pick-up trucks and sedans. 4^D vehicles are expensive; 
furthermore, 4WD vehicles consume tremendous amounts of fuel, and in fuel- 
short Somalia this can be a potential problem in the future.
The team observed that the quality of drivers on vehicles provided to 
the Government is very poor. It is noted that a mechanic has been assigned 
to the ■'operation; however, the team feels that driving lessons would probably 
save more vehicles than the mechanic.
Heavy transport for relief goods is not currently adequate; more trucks 
are needed, and it is noted that a large number of vehicles have been re­
quested. The present vehicles, however, are inefficiently utilised. All 
FIAT trucks should be modified in order to enable them to carry greater loads. 
The addition of wooden grating on the sides would enable the carrying capacity 
to be increased 50-70%. The use of trailers is excellent, and this practice 
should be extended to the Landrovers and Landcruisers so that they could be 
employed on light logistical missions or for use in emergencies.
One major deficiency that was noted is the inadequate number of water 
trucks used to service camps, which are supplied by truck during the dry 
periods. At the Dam Camp in the Hargeisa region, water supplies provided by 
truck were down to three cups of water per person per day, due to mainten­
ance problems and a high accident rate for the water trucks. In the Corioli 
area, two water trucks are used to service three camps; the water supply was 
estimated at less than one litre per person per day. In both the cases cited, 
adequate water supplies were available; the ability to deliver these supplies 
was the problem. (See Section II B 2 for further details.)
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - To the 
greatest extent possible, field offices should standardize vehicle purchases 
and, where necessary, develop the capacity to itself provide maintenance for 
vehicles used by HCR and counterpart agencies.
In situations where imported vehicles not used locally are required, 
vehicle maintenance agreements should be developed with the manufacturers 
representatives. A number of companies such as Toyota, Nissan Motors and 
Volkswagen have trained personnel who can be contracted to provide complete 
vehicular maintenance services in special situations. UNHCR should contact 
the various manufacturers and establish prior agreements whereby maintenance 
teams could be sent to an area where maintenance facilities are lacking.
10. Accounting - The Branch Office reported that accounting was a 
particular problem as the operation expanded; not only were the standard 
accounting procedures deemed to be inadequate for the emergency situation, 
but the lack of trained accountants within the structure of the Branch 
Office meant that much time had to be devoted to accounting rather than 
to operations.
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - When an 
emergency is encountered, the Branch Office should be supplemented with an 
accountant and a specialized emergency accounting system should be instituted.
A number of model systems, appropriate to specific types of operations, should 
be developed in advance and should be included in an Emergency Operations 
Handbook for field officers.
11. Procedures - The staff of the Branch Office cited several problems in 
procedures, which inhibit emergency response. It was felt that the existing 
procedures for field offices (BAFl) are not adequate or flexible for quick 
enough emergency response. The staff of the Branch Office recommends that
a number of indicators be developed that would lead to the designation of 
an emergency situation; once those indicators have been identified and verified 
there should be direct communication between the Representative and the 
High Commissioner to designate an emergency. Once the emergency has been 
designated, certain administrative procedures should be waived for a set 
period of time (or during the time-period of a designated emergency).
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - Among the 
critical areas cited by the Branch Office in which improvements are recommended 
are:
a. the speed-up of processing of Letters of Instruction;
b. the need to increase authorization for immediate local expenditures 
to comparative UN levels (for example, the UNDP ResRep can commit up to 
US$400,000 without authorization from its Headquarters. It was pointed out 
that, were it not for the implementing partners, no purchases could have 
been made until several months after the emergency was identified.)
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12. Resource identification - The team observed that many of the prob­
lems currently appearing in the camps could adequately be resolved by properly 
matching technical assistance resources to the specific problems. However, 
there was a lack of awareness of how to deal with specific problems and how 
to match the appropriate technician to the specific problem or need. It 
was also observed that many of the agencies are being underutilized, or 
that agencies that would be appropriate to deal with specific situations 
have not been requested to provide services.
Contributing to this problem are the lack of information available to 
the staff on technical assistance resources, and the capabilities of agencies. 
Furthermore, the general orientation of the personnel in the Branch Office, 
and their previous experience, does not properly prepare them for dealing 
with specific technical assistance matters in an emergency situation.
Support from Headquarters does not seem to have been adequate in this regard, 
except in the fields of agriculture and water resource development.
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - When an 
emergency occurs, the local staff must be supplemented by personnel who have 
experience in technical assistance matters. In some instances, trained 
technicians should be added to the staff immediately in order to provide 
assistance to the Branch Office until implementing partners can be identified 
and brought in to conduct the field operations in various sectors. In order 
to facilitate technical assistance, several items were needed, including a 
resource index, a field library with basic information relating to technical 
assistance requirements, and guides to operational issues. A list of volun­
tary agencies and their specialities and capabilities, as well as private 
companies and research institutions with specialized capabilities in the 
relief or development fields, should also be provided. Orientation concerning 
basic technical assistance and related issues should be provided in a 
professional development course for potential field officers and branch 
managers.
13* Personnel - Throughout all levels of the UNHCR operations in Somalia, 
there is a lack of experienced personnel. This is an especially critical 
problem, due to the fact that neither the Government nor the implementing 
partners (the voluntary agencies) have a corps of experienced personnel. 
Although doing their best under the circumstances, the UNHCR personnel 
are inadequately prepared and trained to deal with the emergency situation 
at hand.
operation and to attain adequate levels of staffing to conduct all the re­
related to personnel matters, which inhibit effective operations. First, 
the HCR personnel hiring procedures force the agency to hire for a period
staff can be quickly bolstered from local resources. The practice of hiring 
staff in Geneva contributes other problems as well, for often the staff
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - In order to
the emergency, two actions are recommended (in addition to those outlined 
earlier under "staffing"):
of specialists from within HCR who are field-oriented (the field staff of 
the Somali operation concurs with the report of the Bangkok Seminar, that 
an emergency action group coordinated within the appropriate Regional Section 
of HCR during emergencies should provide this type of support,)
b. The capabilities of HCR staff in emergency operations should be 
enhanced through a professional development programme wherein disaster 
management training is provided as well as orientation as to how to conduct 
field operations. The latter is currently provided to a limited extent to 
new staff in HCR; it is felt, however, that a more rigorous professional 
development programme should be instituted for the staff who are likely to 
become representatives or programme officers in a disaster area. This 
training should be provided on a recurrent basis, so that new information 
and techniques, as well as the experience of past operations, can be brought 
into UNHCR emergency operations.
14. Liaison with voluntary agencies - On the surface, liaison with volun­
tary agencies would appear to be adequate. A weekly co-ordination meeting 
is held in Mogadiscio for the leaders of the voluntary agencies and the UN 
personnel, and an adequate exchange of information occurs through other
a. When an emergency is declared, a small team of specialists should be 
sent from Geneva to supplement the field staff; this team should be a corps
...................................._________
_______________
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channels, with both personal contact and the practice of sending written 
reports and memos hack and forth at all available opportunities. Yet, when 
examining liaison in depth, the mission found the voluntary agencies looking 
to HGR for leadership and guidance, and complaining that these are not 
forthcoming. The problem has been especially critical in the various field 
regions; though, the recent assignment of field officers in various locations 
in the regions should improve this situation. However, there still exists 
a lack of clarity as to specific responsibilities and roles; this is 
especially a problem in the area of purchasing and in committing funds for 
specific activities such as water resource development. Contributing to 
the problem is that fact that the voluntary agencies have not sent highly 
experienced personnel, and therefore stalemates often occur while the 
agencies and HCR wait for the other to make suggestions or provide guidance 
on certain topics. Unfortunately, this is a case of not simply a matter of 
leadership as much as it is a problem of neither party knowing what to do.
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - The objectives 
of liaison with voluntary organizations working with or under HCR should be:
a. To ensure that all refugees receive a basic minimal standard of support 
and services;
b. To co-ordinate the services offered by the voluntary agencies to 
ensure that no gaps in the services or levels of services occur;
c. To ensure that all refugees receive equal services.
To accomplish these aims, HCR should:
4a. Provide leadership and direction through participation in voluntary 
agency programme planning;
b. Provide technical information, such as a central library on relief 
operations and programmes;
c. Institute ongoing information sharing activities at all levels such 
as regular coordination meetings, seminars, and provision of technical per­
sonnel to informally assess voluntary agency programmes.
d. Develop, with participation of the.voluntary agencies, uniform 
standards and policies for the programmes being carried out by the voluntary 
agencies.
To be prepared for these activities, HCR should:
a. Develop a set of model standards which can be used by the Branch 
Office as a guide for developing local standards.
b. Compile a mini reference library of technical information for use 
by Branch Offices.
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c. Provide staff with orientation about voluntary agencies and their 
specific operational needs.
d. Provide the Branch Offices with confidential data on the capabilities, 
strengths and weaknesses of the voluntary agencies working in that operation.
e. Develop assessment procedures by which the Branch Offices can monitor 
the activities of the voluntary agencies.
15. Liaison with local government - Contacts with the local government 
appear to be adequate at all levels of the relief operation. While the 
liaison is adequate and information does flow back and forth between the 
organizations, the quality of the information, as noted earlier, does not 
provide an adequate basis for project planning or administration. As in 
the case with the voluntary agencies, the Government of Somalia looks to 
HCR for advice, teclinical assistance and leadership in many areas. While 
the Government of Somalia does not want the HCR role to become heavy-handed, 
nor for HCR to become operational in the broader sense, it still expects a 
fairly high level of service from HCR. In order to effect better co-ordina­
tion at all levels, HCR should assign specific staff to each area of opera- 
tion to co-ordinate more closely and monitor Government operations.
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - To be effect­
ive in liaison with a host government, two levels of involvement are re­
quired: political and technical. The political is not subject to any
standard rules and each case must be dealt with individually. On the techni­
cal level, HCR can be more effective by being prepared to deal with the 
technical issues and problems that arise (and in many cases, in the routine 
da.y-to-day contact with a government, it is the technical questions that 
predominate). The steps required in order for HCR to improve its technical 
liaison capabilities are generally the same as those recommended for im­
proving liaison with voluntary agencies.
B. Camp operations
1. Camp planning - The planning of each of the refugee camps differs 
greatly. In some camps a grid system is used; in others refugees claim 
land without regard to a plan except with concessions to a few roads which 
divide the camps into sectors. While unimaginative, each does meet the 
basic needs of the people. Space allocation is more than adequate, and 
density levels meet a, high standard for individual allocation of space.
The siting of the camps along the rivers is good, though in the camps 
around Luk the spacing between camps is barely at a minimum for providing
good sanitation. In order to keep sewage from one camp from contaminating 
the drinking water of those downstream, the camps along the river should he 
kept to their present size and not expanded. The distance between the camps, 
the shallow depth of the water, and the sandy river bottom will all help 
to purify the water to a limited extent. If new camps are built, they 
should be spaced further apart.
For purposes of hygiene, areas along the bank should be designated for 
specific uses - for example, drinking water should be at the first point 
upstream, water for washing dishes and utensils next, water for bathing next, 
water for washing clothes next, water for washing animals beyond that.
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - Simple 
information on camp planning practices and the siting of camps along river 
streams is available from a number of sources, including WHO, several 
voluntary agencies, and INTERTECT. Information of this type can be collected 
and provided to the Government or counterpart agencies immediately upon the 
outbreak of an emergency situation. This type of information can also be 
provided in an Emergency Operations Handbook.
2. Water - The problems relating to water are divided into two categories 
water quantity, and water quality. In terms of quantity, only in the Gedo 
region were water levels deemed to be adequate. In Hargeisa, in two of the 
camps visited - Saba’ad and Agabar - water was available from small excava­
tions in the river beds, though the quantities were minimal at best. In 
the Dam Camp, where water is trucked to the people, the amounts provided 
were totally inadequate, at one point less than 3 cups of wader per person 
per day. In the Corioli camps, which are also supplied by truck, water 
levels were between 1 and 2 litres per person per day. In both of the cases 
where tankers supply the water, adequate water resources were available; 
only the lack of adequate numbers of tankers reduced the quantities available 
to the people in the camps. Part of the problem appeared to be the target 
level for water quantities and the lack of understanding of the correlation 
between water supply a.nd various related health problems and disease.
It has been shown through experience that there is a direct correlation 
between the quantity of water supplied to refugees and health problems. 
Fifteen to 20 litres of water are considered the minimum for refugees in 
a camp. With various reductions of this quantity, certain routines or 
activities will not be possible. With the first reduction, clothes will 
not be washed, with the next level of reduction bathing will be greatly 
reduced, with the next level cooking utensils will not be wa.shed, at the
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next level food cannot "be adequately prepared, and finally, at the next 
level, water will he inadequate to support strenuous activities outdoors, 
and at the lowest level water will he insufficient to provide for normal 
drinking requirements. At the first level of reduction, skin diseases and 
fungus will become a problem; at the point where the washing of cooking 
utensils is reduced, diarrhoeal diseases will become a major problem. With 
the water levels currently supplied by tanker, only the last three activities 
mentioned above can be successfully accomplished.
The team reviewed the various activities in Hargeisa to develop alter­
native resources and to exploit further the resources of water currently 
available along the river camps. It was noted that these efforts have been 
slow to develop, due to delays on the part of both HCR and the voluntary 
agencies assigned to this role. The necessary equipment and an adequate 
level of funding has not yet been attained.
The quality of water provided in all cases leaves much to be desired. 
There are no attempts to purify the water provided in the camps, or to pro­
tect the sources of water from contamination. It was repeated time and time 
again that the refugees were expected to boil the water before consumption; 
however, it is unrealistic to expect the refugees to do so, as boiling the 
water requires fuel and an abundance of water, neither of which are in great 
supply. In some camps, water is pumped from a nearby river directly into 
holding tanks, yet no attempt has been made to purify the water in these 
tanks. In other cases where the water is trucked to the camp, chlorination 
of the water and the receiving tanks would be a simple means of protecting 
the water, yet in no case m s  this observed, nor are there indications that 
such activities are planned.
In those camps that are placed along the banks of the same river, as 
for example the camps along the Juba River near Luk, measures must be taken 
to safeguard the quality of the water. While sunlight and filtration by 
sand will reduce the threat of disease, they will not eliminate it entirely. 
In other regions, where open water reservoirs are seen as the primary means 
of storage and distribution of water, improvements in these facilities must 
be ma.de and efforts taken to safeguard the water resources.
The mission noted that water resource development is a priority of the 
Branch Office, and in each area activities are being undertaken. These 
efforts, however, have been slow to develop, and several - especially those 
in the Hargeis - could come to naught if the rains, which are overdue, come 
before the projects are completed. As water is the most critical element in 
supplying refugees, greater attention must be given at the outset of a.n
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emergency relief operation to providing adequate resources of this 
commodity.
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - UNHCR 
should identify, in advance, water resource development experts and organiza­
tions with the equipment and staff to develop and protect water resources and 
send them to the site at the outset of an emergency operation.
3* Sanitation - The only camps visited with any sanitation facilities 
whatsoever were in the Corioli area. In the remaining camps, some of which 
have been open for more than a year, no sanitation measures have been taken 
at all. Many of the health problems now occurring in the camps are related 
to poor sanitation, especially many of the diarrhoeal diseases. Emphasis 
to date has been on trying to cure diarrhoea instead of preventing it.
As the rainy season approaches, the potential for sanitation-related diseases 
will be increased many-fold.
Contributing factors to the sanitation problem are the tradition of 
the people of using open spaces, and a lack of prior experience in using 
latrines; thus, the environment around the camps is very polluted. When 
the rains come, flies will breed in this waste and bring the diseases back 
into the camps.
Other contributing factors are the lack of funds for sanitation 
activities and a stated lack of equipment, though in reality these would be 
easy to rectify and funds have been earmarked for this purpose, though not 
yet committed. The primary reason seems to be the la-ck of emphasis on the 
part of UNHCR and the NRO on dealing with the problem.
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - Sanitation 
must be stressed in operations preparedness. One of the very first installa­
tions in a refugee camp should be the latrine system, and all HCR field 
staff should continually stress the importance of sanitation to the counter­
part end implementing agencies. Guidelines for planning refugee camps 
should be established and a specific line item for sanitation facilities 
and equipment should be prominently displayed on the budget forms. Beyond 
this, HCR can take other measures; great strides have recently been made 
in developing sanitation units, such a„s the Aqua privy and the OXFAM sanita­
tion unit, for refugee camp usage. HCR should develop models of its own 
choosing and arrange in advance for mass production of these units ; also, 
standing orders should be arranged so that large quantities can be provided 
by the manufacturer at short notice.
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Adequate sanitation also requires an active vector control programme, 
especially to control flies. In the early stages of an operation, before 
latrines are installed, vector control can play an important part in 
controlling disease, especially in situations where the open environment 
is used for defecation. Controlling the flies that would breed in the 
waste material can buy time until a complete sanitation system is in­
stalled, For preparedness, HCR should identify suppliers of hand-sprayers 
and the appropriate chemicals, and procure and send them during the 
initial stages to the Branch Office.
4. Garbage collection and disposal - The problem of waste collection 
and disposal for the refugees in general does not appear to be a problem 
in any of the Somali camps. To begin with, there is very little waste 
material being generated by the relief supplies, and where left-over mater­
ials such as tins, burlap bags, etc., do exist, they are re-used by the 
refugees. A number of houses were observed to have small garbage pits, 
and in one camp in Corioli several 200 litre drums were placed throughout 
the camp as refuse collectors, and camp officials indicated that they were 
emptied once a week.
One problem was brought to the attention of the mission, and that 
was the problem of the disposal of used medical material. In numerous 
camps in the Luk area, children were observed playing with syringes and 
vials used for holding medicines. In one camp, a collection of various 
waste materials from the clinic area had been left unattended, and animals 
were observed rooting through the refuse and carrying portions of the 
material out into the C3,mp.
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - Garbage 
collection is usually one of the areas most overlooked in providing a 
safe environment in a refugee camp. The disposal of medical waste, in 
particular, is an area that needs adequa.te fore-thought and.planning.
This, of course, should be the concern of the implementing partner - 
indeed, most professional agencies would have the proper facilities and 
take proper care to see that waste disposal was carried out. It should, 
be a function of HCR to check with agencies to make sure that adequate 
provisions are being undertaken. This, as well as other inspections of 
the activities carried out by counterparts and implementing agencies, 
should be part of a routine inspection checklist for camp operations.
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C. Feeding and nutrition
1. Basic food rations - In the majority of the camps visited, it was 
observed that basic food rations were partially or completely exhausted.
Food stores were completely empty at Agabar, Halba I and Halba II camps, 
but for the last few sacks of food left over from previous distributions.
In fact, in the Halba camps, food destined for the supplementary feeding 
programs was observed being diverted for basic ration distribution, in order 
to partially offset the critical situation which had developed. In most 
other camps, supplies on hand in the storerooms were low in relation to the 
size of the camp populations for which they were intended. In several cases, 
especially in the Hargeisa Region, further food distributions had been effect­
ively suspended by the camp officials since the amounts of some individual 
food items available per family from the supplies on hand fell under the 
daily basic ration set by the National Refuge Office.
It would appear that the GOS has almost completely exhausted its food 
reserves so that the NRO central storerooms are all but empty. Attempts by 
the UNHCR/Somalia staff person in charge of logistics and the members of the 
INTERTECT team to visit the NRO stores have not been successful.
It is evident that although the relief operation has been able to ’’muddle 
through” up until the present time, the current situation appears too critical 
for this to continue without serious ramifications. Any disruption of 
scheduled deliveries to Somalia or from the regional stores to the camps 
themselves (for reasons such as impassability of roads during the forth­
coming rainy season, shortages of fuel, or problems of maintenance or repair■
of trucks), or a sudden influx of new refugees due to increased military 
action or drought in the region, could cause the marginal situation to 
become totally unmanageable.
It is important to note that the basic food rations destined for the 
refugees are not only lacking in quantity at the present time, but if 
delivered according to NRO guidelines would be also lacking.in quality.
Two or more different rations are planned; Table 1 illustrates two ration 
lists currently in use.
Tables 2 and 3 give details of the nutrient composition of the two 
food rations and the percentage adequation of the recommended daily allow­
ances (RDA) for different subgroups of the population, respectively.
From these data, the following conclusions can be drawn with regard to 
the quantity and quality of the average basic food ration, with respect to 
the different subgroups of the refugee population.
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Table 1j Basic food ration lists in use in Shabelli and Hargeisa
Regionst as set by the National Refugee Office of the Government 
of Somalia, 1980.
Region SHABELLI HARGEISA
Pood item Dry weight ration/person/day (g.)
POLISHED RICE 75 100
WHOLE MAIZE (or SORGHUM) 25O 200
FORTIFIED DRIED SKIMMED MILK (DSM) 50 50
WHITE SUGAR 40 60
EDIBLE OIL 40 60
BEEF (weekly ration) 250 -
TEA 3 -
WHEAT FLOUR - 60
Table 2: Nutrient composition of basic food rations in use in Shabelli
and Hargeisa Regions, as set by the National Refugee Office of 
the Government of Somalia, 1980.*
Region SHABELLI HARGEISA AVERAGE
Nutrient
Calories 1,949 2,249 2,099
Protein (g.) 55.4 51.6 53.5
Vitamin A (i.U.) 2,875 2,800 2,838
Vitamin B: Niacin (mg.) 8.4 6.8 7.6
Thiamine (mg,) 1.20 1.17 1.19
Riboflavin (mg,) 1.23 1 .11 1.17
Vitamin C (mg,) 3.5 8.5 8.5
Iron (mg.) 8.7 8.0 8.4
Calcium (mg.) 669 671 670
*Source: Platt, 1962,
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Table 3t Percentage adequation of the recommended daily allowances for 
population subgroups of average basic food rations in use in 
Shabelli and Hargeisa Regions« 1980,*
Nutrient Calories Protein Vit.A Niacin Thiamine Ribo. Vit.C Iron Calcium
Subgroup Percentage adequation! 100$ means fully adequate.
Children 1-3 yrs. 154 334 341 84 238 146 43 84 134
7-9 yrs. 96 214 213 52 132 90 43 84 134
Male 13-15 yrs. 72 145 117 40 99 69 28 47 96
Female 13-15 yrs. 84 173 117 46 119 78 35 35 96
Adult male 70 145 113 38 99 65 28 93 134
Adult female 95 184 113 52 132 90 28 30 134
Pregnant female 82 141 113 45 119 78 17 30 56
Lactating..female 76 116 71 42 108 69 17 30 56
^Source: Passmore, et.al., 1974*
a. Taken on an individual basis, the food quantity of the ration, i.e. its 
caloric content, is adequate for young children but inadequate for teenagers, 
adult males and pregnant and lactating females. However, by distributing 
food by family, averaging takes care of some of these difficulties. The 
deficiency of calories for pregnant and lactating females is normally resolved 
through supplementary feeding programmes, yet these are only operated in a 
few camps.
b. As is common in emergency food rations, excessive emphasis has been 
placed upon the delivery of protein in the diet. However, nearly half the 
protein is derived from maize, and nearly half from DSM. Should either of 
these food sources be removed from the ration due to shortages, the RDA would 
not be met for two of the vulnerable groups, the pregnant and lactating females.
c. The vitamin A content of the ration is adequate for all age groups and 
sexes, except lactating women. The vitamin A is almost entirely supplied by 
DSM, so that should this food item become scarce, the ration would become 
virtually free of vitamin A. Thus the importance of supplementary feeding 
programmes is again highlighted.
d. The basic ration is not adequate in niacin (a member of the vitamin B 
group), for all age groups and sexes, due to dietary reliance on maize or 
sorghum. Deficiency over an extended period will lead to the appearance of 
pellagra in the population.
e. Thiamine (vitamin B^) and Riboflavin (vitamin B^) are more adequately 
supplied in the basic ration. However, the vast majority of the thiamine 
(as is the niacin) is delivered by the maize component of the ration, and
if this food item becomes scarce, symptoms of beriberi would become widespread 
amongst camp populations.
f. The vitamin C content of the basic food rations is wholly inadequate, 
and is supplied in its entirety from DSM. Fresh fruit and vegetables are 
not supplied in the basic ration nor in the existing supplementary feeding 
programmes.
g. The iron content of the basic camp rations is inadequate, especially 
for the female population whose needs are always greater than those of the 
male population. Supplementary feeding programs could resolve this deficiency 
for pregnant and lactating women, but the remainder of the female population 
of the camps can be expected to become severely anemic if this dieta.ry regime 
is maintained over long periods.
h. The adequacy of calcium in the basic ration is satisfactory for all 
groups except pregnant and lactating women, due to the dietary contribution
of DSM. Supplementary feeding programs therefore are needed to prevent growth 
deficiencies in infants and young children.
In conclusion, the basic ration utilized by the NRO at the present time 
is seriously deficient in both quantity and quality. There exists an urgent 
need to revise the basic ration in order to improve the nutritional short­
comings.
It is important to note that the serious quantity and quality deficiencies 
in the refugee diet most adversely affect the vulnerable groups: children
and pregnant and lactating women. In the particular case of Somalia, the 
majority of the camp population happens to be women and children, so that 
the deficiencies described actually affect the majority of the people 
currently living in the refugee camps.
Factors contributing to the problem - The following factors were 
identified as contributing to the problems in basic food rations.
a. In general, food shipments to Somalia have not kept pace with needs.
The GOS has all but exhausted its stocks of food staples (sorghum is no 
longer available within the country), and the World Food Program (WFP) 
supplies have not been sufficient to meet the food shortfall. In some cases 
donors have not delivered according to their pledges. It has been argued 
that the refugee population has increased suddenly. The INTERTECT team would
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argue, however, that the refugee population has been growing at a steady- 
rate over the last 12 months, and that even if the predictions of total camp 
population were incorrect even "by as much as 10$, this is no explanation for 
the extreme shortages observed. The mission feels that inadequate monitoring 
and forecasting of needs is the major contributing factor to the shortage.
b. The shortage of heavy trucks and of fuel already cited are also con­
tributing factors but do not explain the shortages on hand.
c. As mentioned earlier, the distribution system does not permit advance 
planning. Although the records permit storekeepers to account for movements 
in and out of the stores, there is little scope for advance prediction of 
when further deliveries will be required, either at the regional level or
in the camps.
d. The absence of adequate supplementary feeding programmes means that 
there is no mechanism by which inequities in the distribution of basic rations 
can be smoothed out. The vulnerable groups are therefore not satisfactorily 
protected against nutritional deficiencies.
e. The time period between basic ration distributions in the camps is 
often as great as 30 days. There is extensive experience in other refugee 
situations (see UNHCR, 1980) that strongly suggests that such long periods 
between distributions are unadvisable. Under such circumstances an "accordion 
effect" often develops, in which the food is used liberally by the family 
when it is first supplied, leading to shortages later in the month. The 
effect becomes more and more exaggerated each month since the family becomes 
progressively more desperate by the time each distribution becomes due.
The ideal time period between distributions is 7 to 10 days.
f. In certain cases, unintentional inequities in the distribution of 
basic food rations to families were observed in the camps, caused by poor 
record keeping and the inadequate family registration. It is essential that 
some kind of card registration mechanism be adopted for all the camps in order 
not only to keep track of food distributions but also to aid in the collection 
of statistics and the maintenance of health and nutritional*'surveillance data.
g. Pood losses were observed in certain camp storerooms, due to accidental 
spillage, and to deficiencies in the food storage system. Some edible oil 
was lost when the cans in which it was transported were smashed; some wheat 
flour was observed to have been transported in simple burlap sacks which
were water damaged at some point in their journey. Losses also occurred in 
certain storerooms due to attack by vermin and birds, and some sacks were 
damaged by being placed directly on the ground.
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Interventions for the solution of problems relating to basic food 
rations - A wide variety of interventions will be required to resolve the 
problems surrounding the delivery of adequate basic food rations to the 
refugee camp populations. The following measures cover the actions that are 
necessary:
a. A comprehensive system of surveillance should be instituted throughout 
the NRO operation to monitor food needs throughout the distribution hierarchy: 
at the camps, in the regional storerooms, and in Somalia as a whole. A 
system is required that permits the continuous monitoring of stocks in hand 
in combination with the advance ordering of supplies before they become 
critically low at all levels.
b. Superior advance supply planning and population prediction by WPP in 
collaboration with the donor countries is essential in order to maintain 
adequate food supplies in the country. It would seem imperative that nego­
tiations be initiated immediately to resolve the immediate food quantity crisis, 
followed by tighter control over the on-going food supply situation through 
more comprehensive planning.
c. At the refugee camp level, a family registration system should be 
instituted, through which local distributions can be monitored and controlled, 
and inequities removed from the system. Adequate systems tested through 
practical experience in the field are described in the literature (Chapter 4» 
de Ville de Goyet, et.al., 1978; Manual No. 10, UNHCR, 1980).
d. More trucks will be required for transportation throughout the dis­
tribution hierarchy, and the storage of independent supplies of fuel and 
materials for maintenance and repair of the trucks would free the transporta­
tion system of dependence of the vagaries of the local market.
e. The rationalization of the nutritional composition of the refugee 
diet by a public health nutritionist should be undertaken promptly in order 
to resolve deficiencies of food quality.
f. Adequate supplementary feeding programmes should be instituted in 
the camps in order to smooth out inequities in the individual nutritional 
requirements between regular and vulnerable .groups in the camp population 
(see Section II I) 2 following).
g. Pood storage facilities and practices should be upgraded in order to 
minimize food losses. Adequate systems have been described in the litera­
ture (see Chapter 8, de Ville de Goyet, et.al., 1978).
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - Normal roles
for HCR in basic rations are:
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- To assist the host government in assessing needs;
- To formulate appeals for food;
- To coordinate donations;
- To provide logistics support when food arrives.
Of these, HCR has no standardized system for needs assessment, especially 
in formulating calorie and nutrient content requirements, nor are staff mem­
bers cognizant of the basic issues in nutrition; the formulation of appeals 
is imprecise due to the lack of knowledge about local nutritional and feed­
ing habits; the ability to coordinate donations is limited by lack of moni­
toring capability; and logistics support is limited to purchasing vehicles.
An additional role which UNHCR should play is advising the Government 
on record keeping and monitoring of food supplies but this cannot be accom­
plished at present due to a lack of experienced or trained personnel and 
model systems.
If HCR is to be effective in each of these roles, it must take appro­
priate action to rectify these deficiencies. While many of these tasks can 
be delegated to WFP or other implementing agencies, HCR must retain the 
capability of making credible evaluations of the contractors' performance.
2. Supplementary feeding programs - In the majority of the camps visited 
by the Mission, supplementary feeding programs were either deficient or 
non-existent.
The NRG medical officer for the Corioli camps informed the Mission that 
supplementary foods were being distributed in the form of a dry ration once
every two weeks to approximately 10% of the camp population. However, the*
figure of 10% of the camp had apparently been arbitrarily set, whereas the 
proportion of persons falling into the generally accepted classification of 
vulnerable groups clearly exceeded that figure. The medical officer estimated 
that vulnerable groups comprised a minimum of 50% of the camp populations 
at Corioli I, II and III. It was not possible to verify- when the last 
supplementary food distribution had taken place.
Supplementary feeding was non-existent at Saba'ad and Dam camps, in 
Hargeisa region. A programme has been organized along conventional lines,
i.e. the distribution of a cooked ration several times per day directly 
to vulnerable groups, at Agabar camp under the supervision of medical 
personnel working with the Catholic Institute for International Relations 
(CIIR). However, feeding had been suspended since all food supplies were
exhausted
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In the Gedo region, the Mission observed a supplementary feeding 
activity (though not a complete programme) only at Halha II camp, under 
the supervision of the medical personnel working with Medicins sans 
Frontieres (MSF). The Oxfam Feeding Kit was being utilized by the team.
No other supplementary feeding programs were observed.
The supplementary foods used differed. Table 4 illustrates 2 rations 
currently used and their nutritional composition.
Table 4s Supplementary food ration lists with their respective nutrient 
compositions in use in Corioli and Halba camps, Somalia, 1980,*
Region SHAEELLI GEDO
Camp Corioli Halba
Form of ration Dry ration Cooked ration
Frequency
\
Bulk distribution 
every 15 days
Twice per day
Food item Dry weight ration/person/day (g.)
FORTIFIED DRIED SKIMMED 
MILK (DSM) 40 80
CORN-SOYA-MILK (CSM) 80 -
WHITE SUGAR 20 -
EDIBLE OIL 15 -
Nutrient
Calories 662 286
Protein (g.) 30.4 28'. 8
Vitamin A (i.U.) 3360 4000
Vitamin B: Niacin (mg.) 6.8 0.9
Thiamine (mg.) 0.82 0.3 6
Riboflavin (mg.) 1.25 1.22
Vitamin C (mg.) 38.8 13.6
Iron (mg.) 14.8 0.8
Calcium (mg.) 1304 1008
O
*Source: Platt, 1062.
Prom the above data, the following broad conclusions may be drawn.
a. Where supplementary feeding programmes are conducted, there is a 
great disparity between the supplementation delivered. Dry rations are being 
distributed by the MO, whereas the more appropriate cooked ration is being 
supplied only by those voluntary agencies with the facilities, equipment
and expertise to carry out the operation on a regular basis.
b. The M O  ration list is nutritionally better balanced due to the 
utilization of a variety of foodstuffs, than the voluntary agencies* regime 
using DSM alone. Milk alone does not constitute a supplementary feeding 
programme. For the purposes of supplementary feeding, a food combination 
supplying more calories, niacin and iron is required.
Factors contributing to the problem - The following factors contribute 
to the problems surrounding supplementary feeding.
a. There would appear to be a poor understanding on the part of the 
GOS and UNHCR as to the function of supplementary feeding for vulnerable 
groups. This lack of understanding has led to the lack of empha-sis on 
the establishment of such feeding programmes. The M O  has not clearly 
differentiated the terms ’’supplementary feeding” (designed to strengthen 
the diets of vulnerable groups), ’’intensive feeding” (designed to recuperate 
seriously malnourished individuals) and ’’therapeutic feeding” (a term not 
currently used in public health work),
b. There is a lack of adequate personnel with refugee camp experience 
with which to mount an appropriate supplementary feeding programme for the 
camps. This is surprising given that personnel experienced in the feeding 
operations in the camps set up in Somalia to deal with the 1974-75 drought 
should still be found within the national population. Conditions in the 
present refugee camps are so similar that for all practical purposes the 
same personnel could be employed to undertake the same work as was carried 
out with reasonable competence in the earlier camps (see Abbas, 1978)*
c. The same factors that have resulted in general shortages of basic 
rations (see Section II D l) influence the supply of supplement ary foods.
Interventions for the solution of problems relating to supplementary 
feeding - The following actions should be taken to establish and/or improve 
supplementary feeding programmes (interventions concerned with the delivery 
of basic food rations also apply):
a. One or more food agencies with extensive experience in programmes of 
supplementary feeding should be contracted to undertake such programmes 
under the supervision and coordination of UNHCR. Agencies with such experi­
ence which should be contacted include:
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- Concern, Eire;
- Bread for the World, West Germany;
- Care, U.S.A.;
- Catholic Relief Services, U.S.A.;
- Church World Service, U.S.A.
Adequate systems tested through practical experience in the field are 
described in the literature (Chapter 4» de Ville de Goyet, 1978; Manual 
Wo. 11, UWHCR, 1980; Chapter 5, PAG, 1977).
b. The involvement of one or more Somali nationals with experience in 
feeding from the 1974-75 relief camps should be encouraged. In this way, 
the supplementary feeding programme can be tailored to fit in well with 
local norms and customs.
c. In all ca.ses the supplementary feeding programme should be implemented 
in close collaboration with established programmes of preventive health in 
the camps (see Section II E 2 in the present report), and in coordination 
with improved WRO food distribution systems.
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - Supplementary 
feeding programmes are an activity that is always required in a refugee camp 
environment. It serves to protect the vulnerable groups but also is an 
ideal programme for delivery of other services such as preventive health and 
medical programmes, health surveillance activities, public health education, 
and monitoring of the basic ration distribution. Normally HCR will contract 
a voluntary agency or the host government to provide this service. As 
important as these programme are, HCR personnel must be conversant with the 
basic issues involved in setting up and running such a programme. In order 
to be properly prepared for selecting the appropriate agency and seeing that 
adequate programmes are established, HCR should take the followin* steps:
a. Provide the Branch Office with, literature on the establishment and 
operation of these programmes. Suitable references for non-medical and 
-nutrition personnel are available.
b. Establish close linkages with agencies that are recognized specialists 
in this type of programme and contract them at early stages of the emergency 
to provide advice on setting up the programmes.
c. Develop model standards which can be used or adapted to guide agencies 
in setting up programmes. (The standards developed in Thailand (UNHCR, 1980) 
provide a current example.)
d. Establish a closer link to WFP and WHO emergency operations personnel 
who are specificalljr concerned with this activity.
e. Develop a mechanism whereby a nutritionist/feeding programme 
specialist can he seconded quickly to the Branch Office to assist in deter­
mining the scope of the required programme, (At present this is left to 
WFP, hut often they do not assign an experienced specialist. Thus HCR 
should have the capability to provide this expertise if WFP cannot.)
In order to serve as a back-up feeding system capable of smoothing out 
temporary shortages and insuring that the vulnerable groups will always have 
adequate food, the supplementary feeding programme should receive separate 
stocks of food. If possible, independent supplies should be established.
The best way this can be effectively accomplished is to utilize the "food, 
agencies” that have their own sources of supply and their own logistics.
HCR should develop standing agreements with these groups to provide stand-by 
services in emergencies.
3. Intensive feeding programmes - Intensive feeding programmes were not 
operating in any of the refugee camps visited by the Mission. In particular 
no such program had been established at the A1 Waq transit camp in Gedo 
Region, and it is doubtful that there exists such a programme at either of 
the other 2 transit camps (one in Hiran, one in Hargeisa) in the country.
The following reasons for the absence of intensive feeding programmes 
were identified.
a. There is no understanding of the function of intensive feeding as 
part of a refugee relief operation. In particular the special importance 
of transit (reception) camps as the appropriate location for intensive 
feeding, medical examination and immunization of incoming refugee arrivals 
before transfer to established camps is not appreciated.
b. Similarly, a lack of adequate, trained personnel exists for the imple 
mentation of an appropriate intensive feeding program in the transit camps. 
Due to the delicate and time-consuming nature of the work involved, it is 
essential that early emphasis be placed on the establishment of personnel 
selection and training schemes so that adequate numbers of workers are 
available to initiate these progra,mines as soon as possible.
c. The procurement and logistical factors that have resulted in general 
shortages of basic rations and supplementary foods apply to intensive 
feeding operations.
Interventions for the solution of problems relating to intensive 
feeding - The measures for the establishment of intensive feeding programs 
in the transit camps are:
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a. A food agency with extensive experience in programs of intensive
feeding should he contracted to undertake such programs in the transit camps 
under the supervision and coordination of UNHCR. An agency with suitable 
field experience is Catholic Relief Services, U.S.A. Adequate delivery 
systems tested through practical experience in the field are described in 
the literature (Chapter 5, de Ville de Goyet, 1978; Manual No. 13, UNHCR, 
1980; Chapter 6, PAG, 1977)- (Note: the term ’’therapeutic feeding”
appears in the older literature in place of the more modern term ’’intensive 
feeding”.)
b. Under no circumstances should intensive feeding be instituted on a 
regular basis in the standard refugee camps, but only in transit (reception) 
camps with the objective of recuperating individuals suffering from serious 
malnutrition. Therefore the logistical planning and implementation necessary 
to supply food, equipment and personnel for intensive feeding need only be 
directed at 3 locations.
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - HCR Branch 
Offices can be made more conversant with this type of programme by provision 
of the available, non-technical literature as well as a guide to the basic 
issues. Information regarding all types of feeding programmes and the 
conditions when they are required should be a part of UNHCR staff training.
D. Health programs
1. Curative health programs - In general the mission noted a dispropor­
tionate emphasis on curative health programs over preventive health pro­
grams. In most cases, the Team felt that high technology solutions were 
being utilized to resolve health problems that would be more appropriately 
resolved with a cheaper, more labor-intensive, less technologically depen­
dent approach.
Almost all camps had established field hospitals where non-ambulatory 
patients are cared for. In addition, all camps have dispensaries (the 
Corioli group of camps have 6 dispensaries in total) where medical consulta­
tions are conducted for ambulatory patients and where drugs are dispensed.
At several ca,mps a rudimentary Maternal and Child Health (MCH.) clinics 
have been established, but the manner in which they function varies widely. 
Equipment at the field hospitals and dispensaries appeared to be quite 
adequate; beds and linen, stethoscopes, sphygmomanometers, disposable 
syringes, and some more technical equipment appeared to be available in 
adequate supply. However, the need for more mattresses, blankets and
32
midwifery equipment was expressed in a number of camps visited. Also a 
lack of adequate refrigeration equipment has hindered immunization cam­
paigns in some camps.
The principal diseases encountered (in rough order of importance) weres
Principal diseases affecting children:
- dysentery, gastroenteritis and non-specific diarrhoea;
- parasitic infections (hookworm, ascaris, etc.);
- protein-energy malnutrition (PEM);
- measles and whooping cough;
- anemia;
- bronchitis and other respiratory diseases;
- fungal skin diseases.
Principal diseases affecting adults:
- tuberculosis (TB);
- bronchitis and other respiratory diseases;
- anemia;
- dysentery, gastroenteritis and non-specific diarrhoea;
- malaria;
- fungal skin diseases.
In most camps suitable drugs with which to treat these diseases 
appeared to be available supplied by a variety of sources (GOS, UNICEF,
WHO, Red Crescent, various voluntary agencies). However, there was some 
doubt as to whether quantities were sufficient to cover the camp popula­
tions, and medicine stores varied greatly in size between camps. At Dam 
camp, antibiotics, anti-mycotic and TB drugs were exhausted and the camp 
medical staff complained that they had nothing with which to alleviate the 
symptoms of scorpion bite. Medicine stores were very low in Saba*ad camp, 
especially with respect to rehydration sachets for children with diarrheoa. 
The Mission was informed that adequate medical supplies were present within 
GOS stores in the country, but that transportation and distribution had to 
date been the limiting factor in supplying enough medicines^'to the camps.
There was some evidence that expatriate doctors working with voluntary 
agencies (and possibly some of the Somali doctors with overseas training) 
were not experienced with disease patterns characteristic of Somalia.
Hence, the Team found that tetracycline was being prescribed for all cases 
of dysentery and diarrhoea which could not be etiologically differentiated 
for lack of laboratory facilities. This is generally considered inappro­
priate treatment.
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In general, an over-emphasis in the use of antibiotics was discovered.
The important point in this respect, however, was the fact that these medical 
personnel were dealing only with the curative aspects of environmental health; 
few attempts by medical personnel to promote the construction of latrines 
or other preventive measures were observed in any of the camps. The doctors 
in the Gedo Region complained of lack of time, but for the most part their 
schedules appeared to include only 4 hours work per .day.
The tendency of the medical staff to rely on high-technology solutions 
is further illustrated by requests that have been made for X-ray equipment 
at the Corioli camps with which to diagnose TB cases, in addition to labor­
atory facilities with which to examine sputum samples. In the camps in the 
Gedo Region, the doctors were requesting an ambulance with which to trans­
port emergency cases to the hospital in Baidoa (about 3 hours’ drive 
towards Mogadiscio on a gravel road). It would appear more appropriate 
to set up a small field hospital in a centrally-located refugee camp in 
the Region, or to develop a suitable medical facility in Luk as recommended 
in the Goundry Report, for reasons of logistics, cost and reliability. 
Interestingly, the Team did not receive requests for laboratory equipment 
suitcable for the examination of fecal samples, which would make it possible 
to etiologically differentiate the various types of diarrhoeal agents in 
patients, and hence reduce reliance on the use of broad-spectrum antibiotics.
Overall, health manpower planning was totally inappropriate for the 
situation, with heavy reliance on a few doctors and nurses (average distribu­
tion, approximately one doctor and one nurse per camp visited). Auxiliary 
personnel were being utilized for primary health care delivery in suitable 
numbers only in the Corioli camps (40 ’’auxiliaries”, mostly Somali medical 
and nursing students, plus a few hundred refugees selected from the camps 
have received a one-week preventive health course with a view to giving 
classes to groups of families). At Agabar camp, about 4 auxiliaries have 
been trained by the CIIR voluntary health team. No outreach system has 
been initiated in the Gedo Region, apparently because the medical personnel 
feel they have to time to undertake the work. Policies with regard to 
the responsibilities, work-schedules, form of payment and quantity and 
quality of training, supervision and evaluation of auxiliary health workers 
in different camps were either non-existent or unstandardized. Health 
personnel at A1 Waq transit camp (6 student nurses) were inadequate to 
meet the medical needs of the arriving refugees.
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2. Preventive health programs - The emphasis placed on the establish­
ment of programs of preventive health in the Somali refugee camps was inade­
quate.
Environmental health measures, such as the digging of latrines, were 
observed to be in effect only in Corioli I camp, where up to 50% of families 
appeared to have latrines. A few latrines had been dug at Corioli II and 
III camps, and at Agabar camp.
Vaccination programs have been incomplete in the refugee camps. For 
example, in the Corioli camps, the medical officer informed the Mission 
that approximately 5OO doses of BCG, 300 doses of DPT and 300 doses of 
polio vaccine had been administered to date. The UNICEF extended program 
of immunization (EPl), which is an extension of the national immunization 
plan into the refugee camps, will be commencing formally starting in the 
Hargeisa Region as soon as suitable refrigeration equipment is available.
Programs of public health education (PHE) appeared to be almost totally 
undeveloped. Educational activities had begun to train refugees in the 
Corioli camps, although it was not possible to observe a PHE class in 
action, nor examine the curriculum. It appeared that empha.sis was being 
placed on the importance of latrines, garbage disposal, and the use of 
soap for hygiene; nutrition education and food hygiene was not yet being 
discussed.
The FOCSIV voluntary health workers (in Corioli) expressed a desire 
to extend their work in the area of preventive health. CIIR workers had 
developed plans to extend PHE activities on a larger scale in conjunction 
with the existing supplementary feeding program. MSF Health v/orkers had. 
given no emphasis to this important area of refugee camp services. The 
Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) country representative appeared very 
committed to preventive health activities within the future scope of action 
of the MCC health team(s) that will begin work in Somalia in the coming 
months.
3. Health surveillance - No adequate health surveillance activities 
were being carried out in any of the camps. The record-keeping being under­
taken was found to be inefficient and unsystematic. In the Gedo Region, 
mortality and morbidity statistics were not available because the voluntary 
health workers said there was no time to record them. In Hargeisa Region, 
the area health officer was able to supply the information recorded in
Table 5•
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Table 5• Mortality statistics for 3 refugee camps in the Hargeisa 
Regiont l).y age-group, January 1st to March 15th, 1930.
Population on 
March 1st
Number of deaths
Camp Age-group January February March 1st-15th
Agabar 43,704 0-5 62 75 44
6-I5 10 15 3
Adults 18 13 7
Subtotal 90 103 54
Saba* ad 57,445 o-5 70 133* 42
6-15 9 4 6
Adults 15 10 9
Subtotal 94 147 57
Ham 42,010 0-5 45 60 32
6-15 7 8 5
Adults 9 5 6
Subtotal 61 73 43
Total 245 323 154
*The excess mortality in Saba1ad camp during February amongst infants and 
ohildren was caused by a measles epidemic.
\
The data presented in Table 5 permit the approximate calculation of 
the crude death rate at 25 deaths/l,000 population/year (as compared with 
the national figure for Somalia, 1977» which was approximately 2l/l,000/ 
year). However, when it is noted that the camp population is probably 
exaggerated, and ths.t the number of deaths is under-reporte‘d, especially 
in the young age-group, then the real crude death rate is probably in the 
region of 30/l,000/year. The difference between a death rate of 30 and 
the national rate of 21 is statistically significant and implies that health 
conditions in these camps are significantly worse than in the nation as a 
whole.
In the Shabelli Region, the only statistics available were the records 
of the health workers in their dispensary treatment recrods (which gave 
patient’s name, diagnosis and treatment prescribed only). However, since
•these records were written in 4 languages (English, Italian, Somali and 
Ahho), and were not grouped and totalled by disease category, they were of 
little value as morbidity records. No other health officers had reliable 
data available.
There appeared to be little or no inter-agency sharing of data regard­
ing mortality and morbidity. Only on a sporadic basis are patients required 
to keep health visit cards (which are no more than handwritten notes on 
plain paper notesheets), and health teams working in the camps did not 
appear to utilize any system of central registration or patient record cards, 
nor were records protected with plastic covers. The problem is complicated 
by the fact that the refugees do not carry any sort of camp registration 
card of any kind. Therefore, to date no system of central mortality and 
morbidity data collection and analysis has been feasible.
i-Factors contributing to the problem - In general, the most signifi­
cant factors contributing to the deficiencies observed in the health programmes 
can be reduced to two categories.
First, the voluntary agencies encharged with the delivery of health 
programmes appear to have little experience in the field. The personnel 
that they have selected are inexperienced in the health and cultural realities 
of a Third World country. Often their University and Medical School 
training is not appropriate to equip them to deal adequately with simple 
communicable diseases that are prevalent in developing countries. The 
orientation supplied to outgoing health workers before departure for 
Somalia is often deficient or non-existent; the assumption is made that a 
doctor or nurse can function adequately wherever (s)he is sent. It is 
the opinion of the Mission that deficiencies of equipment and medicines 
in the field are secondary to the question of the appropriate selection 
and training of health manpower.
Accompanying the lack of knowledge about appropriate health activities, 
there is a serious lack of coordination and information sharing between 
the agencies delivering health services in the refugee camps. More important, 
no efforts to standardize the quantity and quality of services have been 
made. In order to ensure that a minimum standard of preventive health 
activities and primary health care is provided, UNHCR should institute 
minimum standards and provide guidelines on how to effect the standards to 
guide the agencies. The rational distribution of personnel, equipment and 
medicines can be accomplished only through such a mechanism. With the
continuing confusion of activities being undertaken by the various agencies, 
the resulting services received by the camp populations will remain unsys­
tematic and uneven.
Interventions for the solution of problems relating to health programmes - 
A variety of interventions will be required to resolve the problems surround­
ing the delivery of adequate curative and preventive health services to the 
refugees. The following actions should be initiated:
a. Under the coordination and leadership of UNHCR, the delivery of 
curative health services should be standardized in the refugee camps, with 
particular emphasis on procedures. Adequate systems tested through practical 
field experience are described in the literature (WHO, 1977; Werner, 1978; 
Chapter 7, PAG, 1977).
b. Under the coordination and leadership of UNHCR, the delivery of pre­
ventive health services should be standardized, with emphasis on potable 
water, environmental sanitation, garbage disposal, vector control, immuniza­
tion and public health and nutrition education. Adequate systems tested in 
the field are described in the literature (Werner, 1978; Chapter 7» de Ville 
de Goyet, 1978; Chapters 8 & 9, PAG, 1977; WHO, 1977; Assar, I97I; Rajago- 
palan and Shiftman, 1974; Manuals No. 1, 2, 4» 5» 6 and 16, UNHCR, 1980).
c. The central collection of mortality and morbidity statistics should 
be initiated and standardized under the coordination of UNHCR, utilizing 
appropriate registration procedures as established by the Center for Disease 
Control (CDC), Atlanta, Georgia, USA, and the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva.
d. Medical and nutritional surveillance procedures should be established 
and standardized in the refugee camps under UNHCR coordination. Adequate 
systems have been developed and are described in the literature (Chapters
3 & 7, de Ville de Goyet, 1978; Chapter 4, PAG, 1977). (it is noted that 
CDC has been contracted to undertake epidemiological surveillance in the 
refugee camps in order to formally establish the health a.nd nutritional 
status of the camp populations.)
e. Equipment procurement procedures at UNHCR should be streamlined 
in order to facilitate the rapid procurement of essential equipment such 
as refrigerators for immunization campaigns in the field.
f. Transportation of essential medicines and medical equipment should 
be facilitated through the general improvement of transportation services 
for basic food rations and other foodstuffs described earlier.
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Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - HCR field 
staff are generally unprepared to deal with health-related programmes, 
and specifically they are not conversant with the issues related to preven­
tive vs. curative health programmes. To help field staff become more pro­
ficient in these areas, UNHCR should:
a. Provide basic background data relating to the issues surrounding 
health programmes and priorities in emergencies and refugee camps. This 
data could be presented in a handbook for field officers and included in a 
staff training programme.
b. Set up a regular seminar programme with the WHO Emergency Relief 
Operations Division to provide orientation on health matters to HQ staff
likely to be sent on missions.
To help ensure that the voluntary agencies working with UNHCR are 
qualified, greater participation of the WHO Emergency Relief Operations 
Division should be encouraged in the screening, selection and orientation 
of these agencies.
E. Social services
Despite the stated priority placed on the delivery of social services 
by both the Government of Somalia and the United Nations, to date the level 
and variety of programmes provided to the refugees has remained minimal.
Only in the established camps, which have been in operation for over a 
year (especially those in the Corioli region) are any significant social 
service programmes conducted. This is due in part to a lack of manpower 
as well as a lack of adequate resources to provide these services. Given 
the full range of problems confronting the operation at the present time, 
it is advisable that social services retain a somewhat lower priority until 
other more serious problems have been resolved. At that point, it is felt 
that extensive involvement on the part of both the Government and voluntary 
agencies which have experience in social service programmes for refugees 
will be needed in order to develop and conduct the proper range of programmes 
required by the situation. Due to the nature of the refugees - i.e., pre­
dominantly vromen, children and elderly men - a variety of programmes 
especially tuned to their needs will be necessary. Projects of special 
importance will be: agricultural development programmes to help the
refugees become partially self-sufficient in their day-to-day activities, 
as well as handicraft programmes for the refugees, especially the women, 
to bring in additional income. Special programmes for widows and single­
parent families will also be required.
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There are two areas of social services that should he reviewed at the 
present time. These are: reception and processing of new arrivals; and
programmes for unaccompanied minors. The procedures for reception and 
recording of new arrivals is not thorough or well-organized. Some registra­
tion is conducted at the border, and some records are transfered with the 
new arrivals to the camps; however, record-keeping is sketchy - no central 
point receives enumeration on the exact data relating to each refugee family 
and the type of information collected would not provide a basis for an 
adequate tracing system by which to reunite families were major disruptions 
to occur.
Unaccompanied minors and children who are orphaned in the refugee 
camps receive no special consideration in the record-keeping system. Camp 
officials normally place the unaccompanied children with other families, 
which in itself is an acceptable practice except for the fact that no 
records are kept that \tfould allow relatives to tra.ce the children at a 
later date. At this time, the problem of unaccompanied minors does not 
appear to be overly large; nevertheless, an adequate system should be set up.
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - The recep­
tion and processing of new arrivals, and special programmes for unaccompanied 
minors, are two services for which preparedness activities are needed at 
the outset of emergency operations. Simple systems for reception and pro­
cessing have been worked out and the necessary cards for registration can 
be developed in advance and included in an Emergency Operations Handbook 
for field officers so that, when an emergency occurs, the forms can be 
translated and produced locally. Experience has shown that, if proper 
registration is not carried out at an early stage, family reunions, the 
tracing of unaccompanied minors, and the problem of re-establishment of 
families within a refugee camp will all be delayed - indeed, in mani/ cases 
prevented. A model record-keeping system should be developed which follows 
each refugee from his arrival to the final destination, with copies of the 
information collected in a central data center. HCR can help deal with this 
type of situation by providing this model system as well as guidance to its 
counterparts and implementing agencies at the earliest stages of the emergency.
Unaccompanied minors are always one of the most sensitive social problems 
of refugees. Special systems are required to register and trace unaccompanieds 
and in many situations special attention is necessary to ensure that the 
children receive adequate care. As mentioned earlier, in Somalia the 
problem does not appear to be great; few children arrive unaccompanied by
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their parents, and normally, if the parents are missing, other relatives 
are usually present* Experience from other locations, however, most 
recently Thailand, shows the need for HCR to he prepared, not only with 
systems of registration and child care hut also with formulated policies 
relating to child care under these circumstances. Field officers should 
he made aware of the issues related to unaccompanieds and the HCR Branch 
Office should he prepared to move rapidly to act in the children1s interests.
Social service programmes are generally not the type of activity that 
would he included in emergency preparedness because they should he tailored 
to the individual needs of a refugee population. Furthermore, they should 
be geared toward the long-term solution envisaged for the group. There are 
a large number of organizations that have experience in dealing with social 
and economic problems in refugee camps, and a great deal of experience has 
been learned which can he tapped by UNHCR once the refugee camps are 
established.
F. Personal supplies
The list of personal supplies donated for distribution to individual 
refugee families includes blankets, cooking utensils, clothing, soap end 
tarpaulins. The distribution of the materials appears to have been fairly 
equitable, though it must be pointed out that in many cases the material 
provided was of doubtful value. While the refugees have accepted the aid, 
with the exception of the European-style clothing, much of it has gone 
unused. Blankets have been of only marginal importance and necessity, as 
many of the refugees, especially the nomads, brought their traditional, 
blankets with them. Cooking utensils likewise were either brought by the 
refugees or are manufactured from local materials. Refugees report that 
the mess-kit style pails and dishes provided were not easily adapted to 
cooking the traditional meals, though they did point out that they were 
nice for storage. In any case, many ha<ve been sold in nearby markets for 
additional food. The soap provided is valuable, though with the shortage 
of water little of it has been used. Of all the items provided, the tar­
paulins are the most popular and have been especially helpful in building 
or repairing the traditional style "Aqual” or traditional round house, or 
in providing cover for secondary buildings within the housing compound.
Given the current transportation problems and the necessity of allocating 
what available transport exists to the movement of food supplies, a mora­
torium on shipments of personal goods should be imposed.
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Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - In order 
■to be properly prepared to deal with personal material needs, UNHCR should 
explore the following options:
a. Re-orient the purchasing system to allow for a greater level of 
localized purchases.
b. Conduct an investigation into the actual personal material aid 
requirements (by assessing what was used and how it was used in UNHCR1s
past experience') and develop material acquisition plans based on this report.
c. Where personal items are shown to be required in a certain region, 
UNHCR should develop lists of local supplies and keep them updated on a 
regular basis.
O
III. Summary of Major Points
O
A. Preparedness of HCR
The Somalia operation was essentially an emergency that developed from 
a long-term, almost static, refugee situation. The experience in Somalia 
shovxs that HCR was not prepared to deal with this type of situation. Hot 
only was response to the emergency, when it was identified, slow, there was 
no accurate means of determining that a change in the static situation was 
developing. There were no surveillance procedures in place or monitoring 
of the normal indicators that would show that there was a change and a 
growing problem. When the situation was recognized for what it was by the 
Branch Office, it then took months for the HCR bureaucracy to respond 
properly. When it was realised that a large number of new refugees were 
arriving, the staff was unprepared for a proper assessment of the situation, 
which would lead to a proper and timely response.
In order to be prepared for this type of emergency, HCR should estab­
lish procedures for monitoring a situation and establish indicators that 
will quickly provide administrators with information relating to emergency 
needs. In short, HCR must provide information and training to field officers 
on how to assess, and where to assess, and what to assess, in order to 
pinpoint needs.
The experience in Somalia also underscores the need for HCR to develop 
the capability of assessing events on a region-wide basis, especially 
where potential conflict between countries may lead to an emergency operation. 
The events that led to this emergency were known far in advance of the 
arrival of the new refugees and adequate forewarning was gi\ren so that the 
emergency measures could have been taken prior to the time when the situation 
became difficult to handle.
The Somalia experience also indicates that field officers are not 
prepared to deal with the technical aspects of refugee needs assessment.
At the time the emergency started, the professional staff consisted of no 
more than two men, neither of whom has had prior experience or training 
in needs assessment. While various missions were sent from HQ to assist 
in determining needs, the information provided was general and not specific 
enough to assist in the specifics of programme development. In order to 
assist the Government and implementing partners adequately, HCR must 
develop adequate assessment capability, either through training field 
officers or by developing a team of assessment specialists. Reliance on
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voluntary agencies and the Government to carry out this assessment proved, 
in the Somalia case, to he unsatisfactory.
B. Operations planning
The Somalia experience has underscored the fact that UNHCR is unprepared 
for adequate operations planning, either for its own staff and operations 
needs or to advise counterparts and the host Government. While in general 
the staff does understand that certain tasks are required, or that certain 
staff positions must he filled, the specific duties and requirements of 
each position are poorly delineated. Management principles, procedures 
and methods are not knoivn, or not understood. Even some of the most basic 
concepts, such as standardization, pooling and flow charting are not 
practised.
The principles and procedures of operations management are not difficult 
to master. Guidelines can he formulated, procedures can be developed and 
the proper forms printed, and the basic training in operations planning for 
managers can he instituted, thereby achieving a much higher range of re­
sults. UNHCR can he expected to confront a wide range of operational circum­
stances in the future; even when not in an operational situation, HCR will 
he expected to advise counterparts and/or the host Government on setting up 
and managing operations. To improve proficiency, the organization should pro­
vide basic operations planning and management skills to potential heads and 
staffs of field offices, develop a small corps of operations experts to 
assist on a temporary basis, Branch Offices in setting up emergency opera­
tions and establish procedures whereby these operations can t>e easily and 
swiftly administered and monitored.
C. Decentralization of decision-making
It is recognized that the highly political and sensitive nature of 
situations such as Somalia, requires the closest co-ordination between 
Headquarters and the Branch Office. Nonetheless, in order to respond 
adequately to emergency needs, greater delegation of authority should be 
made to the HCR official who is on the spot. Many of the weaknesses and 
shortcomings of HCRfs programme in Somalia are directly attributable to 
this lack of authority. The problems relating to staffing and procurement 
are particular areas of concern in the Somalia operation. In order for 
HCR to be effective in its emergency response, one or a combination of
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the following should occur: all or portions of the procedures in BAFT
should he waived or streamlined, or simplified procedures should go 
into effect or new procedures designed especially for the emergency 
situations should temporarily supercede BAFT*
D. Staffing patterns
Many of the problems related to adequate assessment of the situation 
and deficiencies in the planning of support operations for the refugees 
can he attributed to the fact that HCR does not have on its staff techni­
cians who can provide advice and immediate support in the technical fields 
during an emergency. Traditionally HCR has relied on voluntary agencies 
or consultants to fill this gap. The experience in Somalia shows that the 
voluntary agencies can provide only a limited range of technical services. 
In many cases, the staff provided are inexperienced or improperly trained 
to deal with conditions in developing countries. HCR must have a small 
team of people whom it can rely upon to provide information and advice 
appropriate to the needs of refugees in developing countries. HCR should 
either retain such personnel in-house, or develop a special arrangement 
whereby such personnel can be seconded almost instantaneously to a Branch 
Office when an emergency develops. The latter option will require a 
much more specific arrangement than simply a roster of experts or a 
series of standing agreements with voluntary agencies. The technical 
experts must work together as a team and have complementary skills, 
otherwise the situation will not be rectified.
E. Co-ordination with voluntary agencies as implementing partners
The diverse range of experience, qualifications and capabilities 
of the agencies chosen to implement HCR's programmes in Somalia demon­
strates the need for HCR to develop mechanisms whereby a higher quality 
and level of service can be provided on a fairly uniform basis for the 
refugees. The disparity between levels of service in different cajnps 
provided under the auspices of different voluntary agencies shows that 
HCR must not only strive to ascertain that agencies are competent in 
their assigned work, but also provide a standard of service as well as 
a basic minimal level of service to the refugees. In order to do this,
HCR should do three things: l) develop model minimum standards for each
refugee camp operation carried out by a voluntary agency or other entity
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contracted and/or paid for by HCR; 2} develop an assessment capability to 
monitor the effectiveness of voluntary agency programmes carried out under 
the auspices of HCR; 3) develop a screening process for determining the 
competence of the voluntary agencies and their key field personnel prior 
to their being contracted by HCR.
F. Information requirements
Many of the problems in the specific operations in Somalia are related 
to the lack of information available to the staff and the implementing 
agencies; not even the standard references on refugee camp operations, nor 
the basic manuals developed for this type of emergency, nor the pamphlets 
and training aids that are utilized by many other agencies world-wide, 
were available in Somalia. In order to be more effective and to place 
a greater range of information in the hands of the administrators, HCR 
should: l) develop a field officers* handbook of information that would
be required for emergency operations; 2) develop a basic library of infor­
mation on field operations, and provide it in multiple copies to Branch 
Offices; 3) establish links to information centres such as VITA, the 
Intermediate Technology Development Group, the Oxford Polytechnic Disaster 
Reference Service and the INTERTECT Disaster Information Service.
* * * * *
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